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Abstract
In a number of interesting environments, dynamic screening involves positive selection:
in contrast with Coasian dynamics, only the most motivated remain over time. The paper
provides conditions under which the principal's commitment optimum is time consistent and
uses this result to derive testable predictions under permanent or transient shocks. It also
identies environments in which time consistency does not hold despite positive selection,
and yet simple equilibrium characterizations can be obtained.
Keywords: repeated relationships, screening, positive selection, time consistency, shifting
preferences, exit games.
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1 Introduction
The poll tax on non-Muslims that was levied from the Islamic conquest of then-Copt Egypt in
640 through 1856 led to the (irreversible) conversion of poor and least religious Copts to Islam
to avoid the tax and to the shrinking of Copts to a better-o minority. To the reader familiar
with Coasian dynamics, the fact that most conversions occurred during the rst two centuries
raises the question of why Muslims did not raise the poll tax over time to reect the increasing
average wealth and religiosity of the remaining Copt population.1
This paper studies a new and simple class of dynamic screening games. In the standard
intertemporal price discrimination (private values) model that has been the object of a volumi-
nous literature, the monopolist moves down the demand curve: most eager customers buy or
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the
European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) Grant Agreement no. 249429. The
author is grateful to 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yToulouse School of Economics (TSE) and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)
1A possible conjecture is that the Muslims wanted to preserve a tax base. However, they might also have
wanted immediate income and further were also aiming at maximizing conversions to Islam. See Saleh (2013)
for an analysis of the impact of the poll tax on the correlation of religious and socio-economic status over these
twelve centuries.
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consume rst, resulting in a right-truncated distribution of valuations or \negative selection".
Similarly, in the dynamic version of Akerlof's lemons model (common values), the buyer rst
deals with the most-eager-to-trade seller types {the owners of lemons{ and thereafter raises price
to account for the information that the seller is less eager to trade than expected. Again there
is negative selection and the price setter moves down the demand curve (or rather up the supply
curve).
In the poll tax example by contrast, the monopolist (the state) moves up the demand curve:
Copts who most value their religion or are richer and therefore less sensitive to the pool tax
remain in the tax base, while converts and their descendants, under the threat of apostasy forever
disappear from that tax base. As we will later note, a number of interesting economic contexts
share with the conversion game \positive selection" and, at least approximately, \absorbing
exit".
One might conjecture that the distinction between positive and negative selection is just
a matter of sign convention, but this is not the case. To start building some intuition about
why this is so, consider a demand curve D(p) = 1   F (p) obtained by aggregating demands
from individual consumers with willingnesses to pay  distributed according to some cumulative
distribution F (). Suppose that the distribution for some reason has been truncated at 0 and
let D0 = 1 F (0); let R and L denote the elasticities of the right- and left-truncated residual
demands. Then R = [ D0(p)p]=[D(p)   D0] (for D(p) > D0) and L = [ D0(p)p]=[D(p)]
(for D(p) < D0). That is, right truncations increase the elasticity of demand, while left ones
leave it unchanged. This dierence is illustrated in Figure 1, which emphasizes the reduction
(invariance) of the set of inframarginal consumers under negative (positive) selection.
This observation has a number of implications.2 The most obvious is that the monopoly price
2For instance, auctions of incentive contracts, which amount to a left truncation of the winner's eciency's
probability distribution, deliver for the winner the same power of incentive scheme as if the winner were a
monopolist; optimal auctions thus only reduce the xed component of rewards (Laont and Tirole 1987). Another
application of this property of the hazard rate is Niedermayer and Shneyerov (2014), in which a platform matches
buyers and sellers. The mechanism that maximizes platform prot can as usual be derived by maximizing total
virtual surplus. An interesting result in that paper is that the platform monopoly prot is also attainable in
a decentralized manner, where the platform charges membership fees to the participants and then buyers and
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is invariant to (moderate) left-, but not to right-truncations of the distribution of willingnesses
to pay, a property whose implications for dynamic screening we will investigate. Indeed, this
paper focuses on the properties and time consistency of monopoly pricing under left truncations.
The dynamics rst studied by Coase (1972) have the monopolist move down the demand curve
once the cream has been skimmed o and the remaining market is the bottom of the barrel;
the intuition is provided by the increasing elasticity of demand under right truncations. The
monopolist's incentive to reduce price over time has been shown to result in the time inconsis-
tency of optimal monopoly pricing and therefore in an erosion of monopoly power. By contrast,
the invariance of the elasticity under left truncations suggests that the monopolist will not be
tempted to move up the demand curve and so optimal market segmentation is time-consistent.
Consider the following monopoly pricing example: agents { the consumers { have unit de-
mand in each of two periods, t = 0; 1, and willingnesses to pay (relative to the outside oppor-
tunity)  distributed on R according to c.d.f. F () and density f() such that the static prot
function for marginal cost c and unit mass of consumers, (p   c)[1   F (p)], is strictly quasi-
concave. Let pm denote the monopoly price (pm = c + [1   F (pm)]=f(pm)). Consumers can
consume at date 1 only if they have consumed at date 0. If the principal (the monopolist) can
commit at date 0 to a sequence of prices, the optimal price sequence is p0 = p1 = p
m. Because
the consumers are the same at the two dates, the absorbing-exit constraint is not binding. Sup-
pose now that the principal lacks commitment ability. Let the principal charge p0 = p
m at date
0, and suppose that consumers expect that the date-1 price will not be any lower. Consumers
with type  < pm then do not want to consume at date 0 and they exit at that date. Consumers
with type   pm benet from consuming at t = 0 regardless of their expectation of p1 and
therefore consume at date 0. Consider then date 1. The monopolist faces survival function
1 F1() = 1 for   pm, and = [1 F ()]=[1 F (pm)] for   pm on its remaining goodwill and
so picks price p1 = arg maxfppmg f(p  c)[1 F (p)]=[1 F (pm)]g = pm, vindicating consumers'
expectations. So the monopolist's ability to implement monopoly pricing is not hampered by
the lack of commitment.
This paper investigates several questions raised by this toy example. First, how general is the
\weak time consistency" result that there exists one equilibrium that delivers the commitment
payo for the principal? Second, do all equilibria under non-commitment deliver the commit-
ment payos? That is, are the commitment payos \strongly time consistent"? Third, can one
characterize exit dynamics when the environment is uncertain and evolves over time (in the
example above, the seller's cost and the consumers' willingnesses to pay might follow stochastic
processes)? Fourth, does the analysis extend to heterogenous discount factors, to inows of new
agents and to nite re-entry costs? Finally, can exit dynamics still be characterized when time
inconsistency prevails?
Section 2 describes the baseline model. Each period, the agent may remain in a relationship
sellers (independently of the platform) make take-it-or-leave-it oers to each other (random proposer model).
Buyers with low values and sellers with high values do not join the platform because of the membership fees.
For appropriate fees, the membership is the same as under centralization and decentralized trade is ecient: all
buyers and sellers who pay the membership fees trade.
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with the principal; exit is absorbing. Ignoring the transfers between the two parties, the agent's
ow payo from the relationship (net of her outside option payo) is increasing in a privately
known type  and may depend on the composition of the remaining installed base of peers as
well as on the current state of nature st. Again ignoring transfers, the principal's ow payo
depends on the state of nature, on the agent's type and on the composition of the remaining
installed base; the model thus accommodates private and common values. At date t, provided
that the agent has remained in the installed base (the parties are still in a relationship), the
principal oers a (positive or negative) price pt which the agent accepts or refuses, in which case
the game is over.
The paper's rst contribution is to show that provided that types (although not necessarily
willingnesses to pay) are permanent, the optimal outcome is indeed time-consistent, and so
no commitment ability is required to implement it (Section 3). More precisely, weak time
consistency is always satised. Strong time consistency obtains if general mechanisms are allowed
and there is a continuum of agents; alternatively, it obtains when the principal sequentially sets
prices under the assumption of no strongly-positive network externalities, together with, for the
case of an innite horizon, the added requirement that either the equilibrium be Markov perfect
or that the principal weakly benet from a greater clientele at the optimal, non-frontloaded price
(we later derive a sucient condition for this property to obtain). The overall picture is that
strong time consistency obtains very broadly with permanent types.3
When the agent's and principal's discount factors are allowed to dier, time consistency
obtains if and only if the agent is more impatient then the principal. Furthermore, the principal's
payo is always independent of the agent's discount factor; this is in contrast with the bargaining
(negative selection) literature in which agent impatience benets the principal, who can then
screen at a relatively low cost.
Time consistency transforms the search for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the no-commitment
game into a simple dynamic stochastic optimization problem. We use this fact in Section 4 to
compute the equilibrium in simple cases. One prominent case has an unambiguous aggregate
evolution: the consumption becomes either more or less attractive over time; alternatively, the
principal over time becomes more or less eager to retain agents. In the borderline case of an
invariant environment, equilibrium leads to all exits (\conversions" in the religious example)
taking place early on. More generally, when consumption deterministically becomes more at-
tractive, all exit occurs at the initial date. By contrast, when it becomes less attractive over
time (perhaps in a stochastic fashion), exit is spread over time and both the principal and the
agent in equilibrium behave myopically, i.e., as if this were the last period (Section 4.1). Section
4.2 looks at non-monotone attractiveness and shows that familiar ironing techniques provide the
3Returning to the initial conversion game, this result sheds additional light on why the Muslim rulers did not
sell non-expiring worshiping rights, instead of setting up a system with a recurring tax providing only a short-term
worshiping right. Two reasons are specic to the context and do not apply to other contexts: First, the payment
of an annual poll tax was dictated by an explicit verse in the Koran. Second, the principal in this context is
also the contract enforcer (this may also apply to the emigration application discussed below), and so long-term
contracts are not credible: A Copt could have paid this \once-and-for-all poll" tax, and the following year or
decade been asked to pay again. The third reason is more universal and results from time consistency: Short-term
contracting yields the principal's optimum.
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characterization of screening dynamics.
When the economy is subject to transient aggregate shocks (Section 4.3), which in a sense is
the polar case of the permanent shocks studied in Section 4.1, shocks have long-lasting eects, the
exit volume decreases over time and this volume is serially negatively correlated. At each date
t, the participation depends only on the worst shock so far and is given by a simple condition.
Section 5 investigates the robustness of our results to nite re-entry costs and to inows of
new agents under the assumption of monotone attractiveness. Section 5.1 extends the model to
nite re-entry costs in the context of monotone attractiveness and provides a lower bound on
re-entry costs (equal to 0 in the case of decreasing/constant attractiveness) for re-entry to be
irrelevant and therefore for the results obtained previously to apply.
The robustness of the insights to inows of new agents is analyzed also for monotone-
attractiveness environments in Section 5.2. Following the literature on negative selection, we
look at whether the absence of price discrimination among identical cohorts impacts the out-
come under commitment and non-commitment. Under negative selection, uniform pricing has
the potential to restore some of the monopoly power that is eroded by the temptation to lower
the price as the principal moves down the demand curve. One may wonder whether, conversely,
the combination of the inow of new cohorts and of uniform pricing might undermine the time
consistency of optimal policies and thereby destroy principal value under positive selection.
For the class of monotone-attractiveness games, we obtain two interesting results. First,
under commitment, uniform pricing does as well as discriminatory pricing. Second, time consis-
tency obtains for decreasing/constant attractiveness, but not for strictly increasing attractive-
ness. In the case of decreasing/constant attractiveness, these results stem from the observation
that the principal's optimal behavior under price discrimination is myopic and so identical across
cohorts; therefore there is no cost for the principal of not being able to make use of cohort in-
formation. Neither is there any time consistency issue.
Under strictly increasing attractiveness, the optimal policy under price discrimination is
described by invariant, but cohort-specic cut-os; all exit within a cohort occurs in the cohort's
rst period of existence, but new cohorts have a lower cut-o, i.e., higher membership, than older
ones. We show that under uniform pricing, a specic pattern of frontloaded payments is both
necessary and sucient to achieve the price-discrimination/cohort-specic cut-os. This front-
loading is what makes the optimal outcome time-inconsistent under uniform pricing (while it is
time consistent under discriminatory pricing).
Section 6 by contrast studies environments in which time consistency does not hold. Solving
for equilibria of principal-agent relationships in the absence of commitment is notoriously dicult
as it no longer boils down to solving an optimization problem. Interestingly, though, the simple
structure of games with positive selection allows us to provide equilibrium characterizations.
Section 6.1 looks at the possibility that the principal's preferences, and not only the publicly
observable environment, change over time. It is well-known that optimal policies are not time
consistent in such environments. With a shifting principal type, both the principal and the
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agent must factor in the possibility that future principals be more or less eager to pursue the
relationship than the current one. We prove two simple propositions. First, if the environment is
invariant (except for the principal's type), the date-t remaining installed base is determined by its
optimal level for the least eager principal so far. Second, whether attractiveness is monotonically
increasing or decreasing, the installed base at any date t is smaller than what the current
principal would induce if he and the agent anticipated that the principal's type would no longer
change.
Section 6.2 studies the case of multiple principals. Under common agency, the agent's exit
pattern is jointly determined by the principals. The analysis thus is a dynamic extension of the
standard commons (or moral-hazard-in-team) problem. Despite positive selection, time consis-
tency is invalidated by the principals' desire to inuence each other's future policies. Nonetheless,
equilibrium in the dynamic retention game can be characterized and shown to have the same
qualitative properties as in the case of coordinated principals (i.e., the single-principal case).
We leave the study of environments in which time inconsistency arises on the agent's side
for future research, and content ourselves with a few remarks. Section 6.3 allows the agent's
type to shift over time. When the agent's type moves in an iid fashion, the equilibrium hazard
rate for the termination of the relationship is constant and there is more exit than in the
commitment solution. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) partnerships, in which exit by one
member implies the dissolution of the partnership are briey discussed in the conclusion and in
an on-line Appendix.
Section 7 concludes with suggestions for future research. Omitted proofs can be found in
the Appendix.
Economic environments with positive selection
Left truncations are closely related to the economics of incumbency; that is, they arise
whenever an authority, rm or technology has an installed base of \customers" that forms a
potential \tax base", but may irremediably exit:
Emigration: In an illustration closely related to the conversion game, suppose that emigration
is an irrevocable decision (or at least one that is costly to reverse). Then an economically
privileged, ethnic or religious group may see some of its members leave as the government levies
more taxes or enacts adverse \non-price" policies toward the group. Over time, only the most
attached to the country or the least mobile members of the group remain in the country.
Employee retention: A rm or an academic department at any given point in time comprises the
subset of legacy employees who are the most committed or immobile. Organization-beneting
policies asking for public service, personal sacrices or wage moderation create a risk for the
organization of losing valuable employees.4
4Following Burdett and Mortensen (1998)'s work on the impact of on-the-job search on labor markets, a litera-
ture has developed that studies rms' retention policies under the threat of incoming outside opportunities. This
literature in particular looks at how a steeply rising wage contract can approximate optimal \sell-out contracts"
that are enabled by entry (or quitting) fees (Burdett and Coles 2003, Stevens 2004). The focus is rather dierent
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Technology disadoption/licensing : A rm or group of intellectual property owners licensing key
patents enabling the implementation of an incumbent technology may be concerned that users
might defect for a new technological alternative. Again, the loyal tax base is composed of those
with the highest benets from the incumbent technology or highest switching costs.
Entry of generics: In a closely related example that has been the focus of much empirical
literature, generic drugs that enter when a brand-name drug goes o-patent are typically far
less expansive (by a factor of 5 or 10) than the brand-name version. Interestingly, the US
retail prices of brand-name drugs tend to increase just prior to patent expiration and continue
to increase (a bit less) post-patent expiration. This phenomenon, dubbed \price rigidity", is
consistent with the idea of positive selection. The brand-name drug manufacturer is left with
the most loyal consumers and has little incentive to lower the price despite a declining market.5
Dyad game: Two parties are involved in some relationship. One of the parties is uncertain about
the other party (friend, spouse, co-worker)'s commitment to the relationship and therefore does
not know how much eort is needed to keep the relationship going. Assuming that the dyad
once dissolved does not re-form, the dyad game is an illustration of our framework.6
Related literature
Following up on early work on dynamic \Myersonian" mechanism design (e.g., Baron and
Besanko 1984, Courty and Li 2000), remarkable progress has recently been made to character-
ize optimal mechanisms under commitment. The literature has derived generalizations of the
envelope characterization of the rst-order condition and conditions under which attention can
be focused on single, rather than compound deviations (Eso and Szentes 2007, Boleslavsky and
Said 2013, and Pavan et al 2014). It has obtained necessary and sucient conditions for the
attainment of the optimal allocation either asymptotically (Battaglini 2005) or overall (Berge-
mann and Valimaki 2010, Athey and Segal 2013, Skrzypacz and Toikka 2013). Kruse-Strack
(2014) studies the optimal commitment policy when the agent must choose a stopping time, the
analog of our absorbing exit condition. The agent's type evolves over time (making the optimum
time inconsistent). Under a dynamic single crossing assumption, the paper provides an elegant
characterization of optimal stopping rules and their implementation.
The work cited in the previous paragraph presumes \double commitment": commitment
to a long-term mechanism if the initial oer is accepted, and commitment by the principal
not to make further oers if the initial oer is rejected. However, commitment is often not
from that in the paper since there is no asymmetric information at the contracting date and thus no dynamic
screening issue; furthermore, commitment is assumed, while the present paper studies the time consistency of
optimal commitment policies.
5In this example, \re-entry" (going back to the brand-name drug after switching to the generic) is relatively
costless. However, as will be shown in Section 5.1, re-entry costs need not be large (and actually can be nil in
the case of constant/decreasing attractiveness, a reasonable assumption for this application) for the results to
hold. Note also that a more satisfactory study of the dynamics of generics entry would take into account specic
institutional features such as automatic substitution requirements. Still the considerations developed here would
be relevant in this richer model.
6For this to be the case, it is important that the informational asymmetry be one-sided. The case of two-sided
asymmetric information is discussed in the on-line Appendix.
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to be taken for granted. Public policies generally lack commitment, and so do a number of
policies in private-sector environments, especially when future policies are hard to describe,
let alone contract upon, in advance. More precisely, long-term commitment may be infeasible
(\no commitment"); or it may be feasible but renegotiable (i.e., it is renegotiated if the parties
involved in the long-term contract all nd it advantageous to do so; this is the paradigm of
\commitment and renegotiation" studied e.g., in Dewatripont 1989 or Laont and Tirole 1990);
nally, further oers cannot be precluded, as in Coase's durable good model.
Much less is known for environments in which full commitment is impossible. In specic
environments (usually two permanent types), both the commitment-and-renegotiation model
and the no-commitment model (without agent anonymity) have been shown to exhibit Coasian
dynamics (Hart and Tirole 1988, Maestri 2013, Strulovici 2013). Similar Coasian dynamics
have been obtained in the common value counterpart of Coase's model, the dynamic version of
Akerlof's lemons model (e.g. Daley and Green 2012, Fuchs and Skrzypacz 2013, Gerardi and
Maestri 2013, Gerardi et al 2014).
Little is known either regarding general properties of sequential screening in such environ-
ments. Bester and Strausz (2001) demonstrate that the cardinality of messages can be conned
to that of types for a nite type space. Skreta (2006) looks at the standard risk-neutral seller-
buyer game, in which, say, the buyer's invariant valuation  is drawn from some distribution
with support the interval [0; 1], and the seller's cost is 0. As long as the buyer is not served,
the seller keeps making oers at t = 0;    ; T . These oers need not be prices pt. Rather they
can be full-edged mechanisms, resulting in date-t probabilities of trade and expected trans-
fers. The central result is that an optimal mechanism is to simply post a price in each period,
generalizing the Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) classic result to sequential mechanism design and
thereby simplifying the search for equilibria in this class of games.
The literature so far has been concerned with a principal selling goods in a market. The
principal's objective is then to attract consumers without lowering price too much. By contrast,
we consider a principal who is trying to retain a customer base while incurring a low cost or
charging a high price. In this sense, this model is a mirror image of existing screening models,
with the less motivated jumping o ship instead of the most motivating getting on board.
Board and Pycia (2014) study pricing by a durable-good monopolist when the consumers
can enjoy an alternative, outside option with positive value. In this framework it is easy to
show that the monopoly price (the price pm that maximizes [  c][1 F ()], where F () is the
distribution of willingnesses to pay and c is the marginal cost) is time consistent: the monopolist
charges at date 0 the monopoly price, those consumers with   pm purchase immediately and
the others opt for the outside option. The principal's (out of equilibrium) beliefs from date 1
on are that remaining consumers have types above pm. Board and Pycia's striking result is that
this is the only equilibrium.7 Our framework diers from theirs in three important and related
aspects. First, Board and Pycia's principal can commit to a long-term contract as is implicit
7In Fudenberg et al (1987), the possibility for the seller to consume the good himself or to switch to bargaining
with another buyer can restore commitment power but there are multiple equilibria. In Board-Pycia, the outside
option is on the buyer side, commitment is fully restored and the equilibrium is unique.
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in the durable good framework (selling can be viewed as a commitment to long-term rental).
The principal's commitment assumption implies that the agent's discount factor aects the
principal's welfare like in pure negative selection models and unlike the pure positive selection
model of this paper. Second, their model exhibits both left- and right-truncations (the more
motivated buy the durable good and the least motivated buy the outside option), whereas the
model studied in this paper has only left truncations and Coase's traditional model has only right
truncations. Third, exit in our model is mechanically induced by the non-continuation/breakup
of the relationship, leading to an innite or nite re-entry cost; in Board-Pycia, non-consumption
need not imply exit, and there is a third potential status (\neither in nor out"). This third status
is not observed on the equilibrium path of the deterministic world of Board-Pycia, but would
become relevant if, as in this paper, stochastic shocks were to aect the attractiveness of the
relationship or principal and agent's intrinsic preferences were to change over time. It would
actually be interesting to extend the Board-Pycia analysis to stochastic environments.
2 Model
Time is discrete: t = 0; 1;    ; T , where T is nite or innite. At the beginning of each period,
a state of nature st is realized in some set St. Let s
t   s0;    ; st 2 St  S0      St follow
a stochastic process with conditional distribution G
 
s jst for  > t. We will say that s  st
for  > t if there exists
 
st+1 ;    ; s

such that s =
 
st; st+1 ;    ; s

.
The players are a principal, who has the bargaining power, and either one agent or a contin-
uum of agents with mass 1, in both cases with a unit demand in each period. Unless otherwise
specied (i.e. in Proposition 1(i) and Proposition 6, all results apply to both a single and a
continuum of agents). All players have identical discount factor  2 (0; 1).
The agent is characterized by a privately-known type  2 [; ], distributed according to
smooth c.d.f. F () with density f(). Each period t, the agent consumes (xt = 1) or does not
consume (xt = 0); exit is absorbing and so her consumption decision however is relevant only if
she has kept consuming in the past. Let Xt  z=tz=0 xz.
In the non-commitment version of the game, the principal makes an oer in each period,
which, together with the agent's response to the oer, determines the allocation in that period.
We will consider two versions, depending on the nature of the oer:
Price-oer version. At each date t, the principal oers a price pt, and the agent chooses whether
to consume (xt = 1) or not (xt = 0).
Mechanism-oer version. More generally, the principal at date t can, as in Skreta (2006), oer a
mechanism that determines the date-t allocation. With a single agent, a mechanism is a message
space Mt, and for each message mt 2 Mt, a transfer pt(mt) and a probability xt(mt) of date-t
consumption. The mechanism also species what the principal learns at the end of the period
concerning the agent's message.8 With a continuum agents, the allocation fpit; xitg of agent i
8That is, any coarsening of the message can be transmitted to the principal. To prove strong time consistency
below, it will actually suce to consider mechanisms such that the principal only learns that the agent has
9
may depend on her message mit, but also on the other agents' date-t messages; in particular, in
the continuum-of-agents version of the model, we will allow the principal to make the allocation
contingent on the number of agents wanting to keep consuming in the period (this will be used
only in part (i) of Proposition 1).
As we will show, the principal gains little traction from using general mechanisms, and
so, in the following description of the full game, we will focus on the price-oer version. The
mechanism-oer version follows straightforwardly from this description.
Information, timing and strategies. At the beginning of each period t, the state st is realized and
publicly observed. In (the no-commitment version of) the game, the principal sets a price pt for
date-t membership/consumption, and previously loyal consumers (those for whom Xt 1 = 1)
decide whether to consume. Strategies fP ; A g are price choices, pt = Pt (pt 1; st) 2 R
for the principal and consumption choices xt = 
A
t (p
t; st; ) 2 f0; 1g for the agent, where
pt  (p0 ;    ; pt). We focus on pure strategies and the equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
This description of strategies assumes that the price (or mechanism) oered by the principal
at date t depends only on the state st (and previous prices, and implicitly on the fact that
the agent is still in the relationship). This is a natural assumption in the private values case.
However, under common values, the principal's ow payo depends on the agent's type. The
measurability assumption can then be justied in one of two ways: The principal may observe
only the aggregate performance of the agents; alternatively, the principal is prohibited from
discriminating among agents. If none of the three conditions holds (that is, if values are com-
mon, individual performance is observable and discrimination is feasible), the outcomes under
commitment and non-commitment dier from those described below.9
Agents' preferences. Relative to the payo obtained by not consuming10, the agent's net surplus
from date-t consumption is linear in the date-t transfer pt 2 R to the principal (a price, or more
generally the conditions demanded by the principal for belonging to the consuming group11);
his gross surplus from consumption depends on his type , on the date-t payo relevant state st
and on the set t  [; ] of types who consume at date t.
The dependence of preferences on t allows for social image/self views and (in the case
of a continuum of agents) network externalities to aect consumption decisions. For example,
the agent's utility may depend, positively or negatively, on the mass (t) of agents in the
consumption group; more generally, network externalities may also depend on the identity of
members of that group. Allowing for externalities adds an argument in the surplus function,
consumed at date t (or learns nothing at all since absorbing exit implies that remaining agents have consumed in
the past).
9On the other hand, if  is observable at the end of the period, the commitment outcome is still time consistent:
In the absence of commitment, the allocation from date 1 on is ecient conditionally on cuto 0 . So the issue
of time consistency does not arise.
10The agent's utility is thus dened net of utility upon exit. This normalization of utility upon exit to 0 is
without loss of generality as it allows the value of exit to dier for dierent types.
11The quasi-linearity of preferences is assumed solely for expositional simplicity. Similarly, transfers more
generally can involve deadweight losses. The key assumption is positive selection.
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but given their relevance in a number of applications, it is worthwhile to investigate whether
the results hold when they are present. We will use the \network externalities" terminology
whether the dependence on t arises with a continuum of agents or with a single agent (image
concern interpretation).
Skimming property. We assume that higher types have a strictly higher gross surplus for all
(t ; st). It is then straightforward
12 to show that, conditionally on having consumed up to
date t, if type  consumes at date t for history (pt; st) (i.e., xt(p
t; st; ) = 1 ), then so does
type 0 >  (i.e., xt(pt; st; 0) = 1). Intuitively, this results from the fact that type 0 obtains a
strictly higher utility from consumption at date t and that the agent's continuation valuation
at date (t+1) is weakly increasing in type (as type 0 can always mimic type 's behavior from
date (t+1) on). Thus, incentive compatibility implies the existence of a unique cut-o t (pt; st)
such that t = [

t (p
t; st); ] and (t) = 1   F
 
t (pt; st)

. Absorbing exit then implies cuto
monotonicity: t (pt; st)  t 1(pt 1; st 1).
We can therefore write the agent's net payo function as a function of the cuto:
(; t ; st)  pt:
 is assumed to be strictly increasing in its rst argument and dierentiable in its rst two
arguments. The intertemporal utility of a type- agent is
EsT
h
t=Tt=0 
tXt(; st)

(; t ; st)  pt
i
:
Principal's preferences. The principal also has quasi-linear preferences, with ow payo
Z 
t
 
 
; t ; st

f()d + pt

1  F (t )

;
and intertemporal utility
EsT
"
t=Tt=0 

h Z 
t
 
 
; t ; st

f()d + pt

1  F (t )
i#
:
The principal's objective function deserves some comment as well. Often, the economic model
denes the  function directly. For example,  
 
; t ; st

could stand for the marginal produc-
tivity of worker  enjoying (positive or negative) production externalities depending on the set
of coworkers

t ; 

in state st. Our formalism thus allows for common values: the principal
may care about the agent's type. For example, loyal employees may be loyal because they are
enthusiastic about their job and then are highly productive; or they may stay because they are
unable to nd another job and then are likely to have a low productivity for the rm. Similarly,
the principal in the dyad game may exhibit reciprocal altruism and then experience a welfare
that depends on (his perception of) . Both cases are illustrations of common values.
12The proof follows the standard lines (see, e.g., Fudenberg et al 1985).
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Sometimes, the economic model gives instead the principal's overall (i.e. summed over
[; ]) gross surplus directly; one must then dene the  function accordingly. For example,
the cost function of serving a number 1   F (t ) of agents might be C
 
1   F (t ); st

. One can
then dene  
 
; t ; st

=  C1
 
1   F (); st

for all , where C1 is the derivative with respect
to the rst argument, and so
Z 
t
 
 
; t ; st

f()d  C(0; st)   C
 
1   F (t ); st

. This latter
example illustrates the possibility of \network externalities" arising on the principal/cost side.
The notion of \externality augmented virtual surplus" introduced below is therefore relevant
under non-constant returns even when there are no direct externalities among agents.
Examples. The model embodies the premises of dynamic screening with left truncations: the
absorbing-exit condition and non-commitment. Let us provide a few examples.
In the basic conversion game, (; t ; st) =  and  (; t ; st) =  c. The agent has preferences
Xt[ pt] where  is the ratio of the agent's religiosity over her marginal utility of income; needless
to say, we could enrich this basic set up with in- and out-religious group externalities. The
principal is the Muslim rulers, with overall date-t instantaneous payo c[1   (t)] + pt(t);
the parameter c reects the rulers' intrinsic preference for conversion to Islam, leading to a
\markup" pt   c on poll-tax-paying Copts.
The same payos can be used to describe the dyad game, where pt represents (minus) the
eort exerted to keep the uncommitted party on board.
With only very slight modications, the model also accommodates persecutions such as
those brought about by the inquisition (against the Albigensian heresy in the 13th century by
the Dominicans on behalf of the Pope or against Spanish Jews and Moslems in the late 15th
century Spain by Queen Isabella and the Tribunal of the Holy Oce of the Inquisition). The
screening instrument employed is then purely wasteful, except perhaps for the conscations, but
the results in this paper do not rely on the tax being a pure transfer between the principal and
the agent.13
In the technology-disadoption game, (; t ; st) = +[1 F (t )]+ st and  (; t ; st) =  c,
where  is a network-externality coecient and st might stand for shifts in the attractiveness
of the challenging technology. The agent has ow preferences Xt[ + (t) + st   pt]. The
principal's ow prot is the (pt   c)(t).
13Let the Catholic rulers' objective function at date t be
 c1  F (t ) K(it)
where c is their disutility of non-conversion, it is the intensity of inquisition (the probability of detecting non-
converts) and K is an increasing and convex cost function. Let the utility of a non-convert with religiosity  be
   itd where d is the relative cost of being caught and tried. The remaining installed based at date t is
Y t 1

1  F (t 1)

where Y t 1 = (1  i0)    (1  it 1). Thus the elasticity at any  remains the same under left truncations, and the
analysis carries over. In particular, varying the rulers' religiosity (c) over time or the impact of the environment
(for example, through K), one can as in Sections 4 and 6.1 derive dynamics of inquisition intensity.
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3 Time consistency
3.1 Optimal mechanism under commitment
Suppose, rst, that the principal can commit to an incentive compatible mechanism that species
for each  a (present-discounted) payment P () and a state-contingent consumption pattern
fxt(; st)gt 2 f0;    ; Tg
st 2 St
(such that xt(; s
t) = 0) xt+1(; st+1) = 0 if st+1  st). Letting
U()  max
f~2[;]g
n
EsT
h
t=Tt=0 
tXt(~; st)(; t ; st)
i
  P (~)
o
;
the participation and incentive constraints require that
U()  0
and
dU
d
= EsT
h
t=Tt=0 
tXt(; st)
@
@
(; t ; st)
i
:
Consider an optimal policy under commitment. Let U()  0 denote the ex-ante rent of type
, and V denote the principal's ex-ante payo for an arbitrary mechanism. Using the standard
decomposition between eciency and rent, the principal's payo can be written as:
V = EEsT
h
t=Tt=0 
tXt(; st)

(; t (s
t); st) +  (; 

t (s
t); st)
  U()i;
where (using U() = 0)
E[U()] =
Z 

U()dF () =
Z 

dU()
d
[1  F ()]d
= EsT
Z 

h
t=Tt=0 
tXt
 
; st
@
@
 
; t (s
t); st
i
[1  F ()]d:
And so the principal's payo can be rewritten in the standard, expected virtual surplus fashion:
V =
Z 

EsT
"
t=Tt=0 
tXt(; st)
h 
(; t (s
t); st) +  (; 

t (s
t); st)

f()
  @
@
 
; t (s
t); st

[1  F ()]
i
d
#
=
Z 

EsT
h
t=Tt=0 
tXt(; st) (; t (s
t); st)
i
f()d
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where
 (; ; s)  (; ; s) +  (; ; s)  @
@
(; ; s)
1  F ()
f()
denotes the virtual surplus. Maximizing the principal's payo amounts to solving the following
program:
sup
f ()g
n
EsT

t=Tt=0 
tW
 
t (s
t); st
 o
(I)
subject to
t (s
t)  t 1(st 1)
where
W
 
t (s
t); st
  Z 
t (st)
 
 
; t (s
t); st

f()d:
The optimization indeed must respect the feasibility constraints (F )14: For all (t; st),
Xt(; st) = 1 ()   t (st);
or, equivalently, cuto monotonicity :
t (s
t)  t 1(st 1) if st  st 1: (F)
As usual, the policy must be optimal for any subform; that is, for all (t; st), fX (; );  ()gt
must also maximize :
Vt(s
t) =
Z 
t 1(st 1)
EsT jst
h
=T=t 
 tX (; s ) 
 
;  (s
 ); s
i  f()
1  F (t 1(st 1))

d
subject to the relevant set of feasibility constraints for all (; s ) such that   t and s % st.
We let fbt(st)gt = 0; : : : ; T
st 2 St
denote the optimal contingent cuto sequence under commitment.15
Next, we show that there is no loss of generality (in the sense that the commitment payo
can be attained{this says nothing about outcome uniqueness) in considering commitments to a
sequence of state-contingent prices that the agent accepts or turns down. This observation has
two implications: First, restricting the principal to price oers rather than general mechanisms
still allows us to compute the commitment welfare. Second, this commitment welfare can be
14Because the cutos are weakly increasing, this condition need only be checked for the last cuto. Note
furthermore that the condition \if st  st 1" in condition (F) can be dispensed with (it does not matter what
the cuto is if st is unfeasible given st 1).
15We will assume but not investigate the existence of an optimal policy. The optimization boils down to a
search for a plan specifying state-contingent cutos ft (st)g so as to solve Program (I), The state of the system
at date t is (st; t 1(s
t 1)). One can then apply standard results in dynamic programming as stated, say, in Lucas
et al (1989).
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attained even if the agent is unable to commit. To show this, consider a contingent price sequence
p  pt(st)	t 2 f0;    ; Tg
st 2 St
so as to implement an arbitrary sequence of contingent, weakly increasing cutos   ft (st)gt 2 f0;    ; Tg
st 2 St
:
Cutos must satisfy sequential incentive compatibility. Introducing the agent's value function:
Ut(; s
t;p;)  max
n
0; (; t (s
t); st)  pt(st) + E

Ut+1(; s
t+1;p;)
o
;
then
xt(s
t; ;p;) = 1 if and only if(; t (s
t); st)  pt(st) + E

Ut+1(; s
t+1;p;)
  0: (IC)
The principal's commitment payo in the price-oer game is:
bV  max
fp; satisfying (IC)g
EsT
h
t=Tt=0 
t
 Z 
t (st)
 (; t (s
t); st)f()d + pt[1  F (t )]
i
:
Note that (for the sake of the denition of bV only), we let the principal maximize not only
over prices, but also over cutos. Indeed, there is no guarantee that a price strategy p leads
to a unique sequence of cutos . Our allowing for network externalities implies a possible
multiplicity of static equilibria if externalities are positive and strong; under Assumption 1
below, though, the principal can guarantee himself bV by choosing p only.
Assumption 1 (no strongly positive network externalities). For all s, the function
(; ; s) is strictly increasing in  (i.e., 1(; ; s) + 2(; ; s) > 0).
Assumption 1 is satised whenever network externalities are negative or non-existent (2 
0). It is also satised for positive network externalities (2 < 0) provided they are not too
large. For example, the technology-disadoption game ((; ; s) =  + [1   F ()] + s)
satises Assumption 1 provided that 1    sup ff()g > 0. Assumption 1 prevents multiple
equilibria in the static game; in its absence, a \wrong coordination" of agents by itself might
induce a payo for the principal that lies below bV . Hence Assumption 1 is a necessary condition
for equilibrium uniqueness in the price-oer game; its necessity for the implementation of V^
is therefore unrelated to the time-consistency issue. In the single-period case for instance, the
optimal mechanism fx() = 1 i   , p() = (; ) if    and = 0 otherwiseg gives rise
to multiple equilibria if there exists  such that (; ) = (; ).
Lemma 1 (irrelevance of agent commitment). Consider a commitment allocation fP (); x(; )g
with associated (monotonic) cutos b() and satisfying U() = 0. Then the sequence of short-
term prices p  fpt(st)gt 2 f0;    ; Tg
st 2 St
dened by the \cuto-myopia" property:
8st : pt(st) = (bt(st); bt(st); st)
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is such that, if the principal commits to the sequence of state-contingent prices p, (i) there
is an equilibrium that yields the same payo for the principal and (for all ) the agent as
the commitment allocation; (ii) if Assumption 1 holds, the equilibrium is unique and therefore
delivers the commitment allocation.
In this sense, there is no need for commitment by the agent. And the principal does not lose
from oering prices.
As we noted in the introduction, while the optimal commitment outcome is time consistent,
not every optimal commitment policy is. Prices can be arbitrarily frontloaded,16 with the impact
of high initial prices being oset by the promise of low prices in the future; however, frontloaded
policies in general are time inconsistent as the principal would want to renege on this promise.
3.2 Non-commitment and time consistency
In practice principals may nd it dicult to commit to a long-term, state-contingent policy.
The absence of commitment is particularly natural either when the principal is a government
or when specifying \non-price" dimensions of the future relationship in a contract is complex.
This raises the time-consistency issue.
Denition (time consistency). Weak time consistency holds if there exists a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the non-commitment game that delivers expected payo bV for the principal.
Strong time consistency holds if all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the non-commitment game
deliver payo bV for the principal.
For part (iii) of the proposition, we will further either focus on Markov perfect equilibria or
make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 (static benets of a greater clientele). For all (t; st),
@
@
Z 

 
 
; ; st

f()d + pt[1  F ()]

 0
at any   bt(st) and for pt =  bt(st); bt(st); st, where bt(st)	 denotes the sequence of cutos
along some optimal commitment policy.
Assumption 2 says that the principal does not mind having a greater clientele provided that
the price is set at the valuation of the current cuto's surplus at the optimal program. In
Section 4, we will provide a sucient condition for Assumption 2 to be satised. For instance,
16A commitment policy (p;) is frontloaded if there exists (t; st) such that
pt(s
t) > 
 
t (s
t); t (s
t); st

:
That is, the cuto type at date t in state st must expect some strictly positive surplus (i.e. a price below his
gross surplus) at some future date  in some state s .
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it is satised by the conversion and technology disadoption games, provided that attractiveness
is constant or decreasing as dened in the next section.17
A Markov perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the players' strategies at date t
depends only on the previous cuto t 1 and the part of the state that is a sucient statistic
for the Markov process (i.e., st if s follows a rst-order Markov process), and, for the agent, on
pt as well.
Proposition 1 (time consistency).
(i) In the mechanism-oer version and with a continuum of agents, strong time consistency
obtains.
(ii) In the price-oer version,
(a) Weak time consistency always obtains.
(b) If T < +1 and Assumption 1 holds, strong time consistency obtains.
(c) If T = +1 and Assumption 1 holds, strong time consistency obtains if either As-
sumption 2 holds or one focuses on Markov perfect equilibria.
Proof.
(i) and (ii)(a) The proofs of (i) and (ii)(a) will use very similar constructions. To prove weak
time consistency in the price-oer version, consider the following strategies on the equilibrium
path:
 The principal sets price pt(st) = (bt(st); bt(st); st) for all (t; st), where bt(st) corresponds to
an optimal allocation cuto.
 The agent consumes at date t in state st if and only if   bt(st).
Myopic agent behavior is indeed optimal given the principal's strategy (the current cuto
has zero continuation utility and so do a fortiori all types below the cuto; higher types strictly
benet from consuming during the period and so do not want to exit). Furthermore, the principal
obtains his highest feasible payo bVt(st) starting at any (t; st). And so the principal cannot
benet from deviating from his strategy in any subform (t; st).
Because the principal's strategy is a function of his beliefs, whenever his beliefs are well-
dened so is his strategy, which, as veried above, is optimal for any subform. Therefore it
remains to consider the subforms in which the principal's beliefs are not uniquely pinned down.
There are two possible deviations by the agent that would lead to non-uniquely specied beliefs
for the principal. Suppose that F (bt 1(st 1)) = 0, but the agent has failed to consume at t 1 (or
earlier). Then beliefs are irrelevant because the game is over due to the no-reentry constraint.
17Under increasing attractiveness, the principal may want to temporarily \price below marginal cost" so as to
keep the clientele. And so a lower cuto may be (at least temporarily) costly to the principal.
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Second, it could be that F (bt 1(st 1)) = 1, but the agent has always consumed up to t   1
(included). Then, specify that the principal puts all weight on type  for the rest of the game
and sets p (s
 ) = (; ; s ) for all (; s
 ) with   t and s % st. The agent therefore cannot
obtain a strictly positive continuation utility by deviating. The specied strategies therefore
form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Consider now the mechanism-oer version with a continuum of agents. Let the principal oer
again in each period price pt(s
t) = (bt(st); bt(st); st) for all (t; st), but as part of a larger two-
stage mechanism within each period: First, agents decide whether to accept. If the total demand,
call it qt, satises qt  1 F (bt(st)), then all agents who have accepted are served at price pt(st).
Furthermore, if qt < 1   F (bt(st)), the agents who have accepted receive from the principal a
large sum of money, and so qt  1   F (bt(st)) necessarily (this participation-enhancing gift is
not needed if there are no network externalities, as it is than a dominant strategy for   bt(st)
to accept the oer, or if the externalities are negative). Second, if qt > 1 F (bt(st)), the agents
who have accepted pay a small amount " > 0 to the principal and play a second-period auction18
in which the best 1 F (bt(st)) oers are accepted and pay the highest losing bid to the principal
(the principal only learns who has won). Importantly, losers do not recoup the payment ". To
see that qt = 1   F (bt(st)), suppose \excess demand": qt > 1   F (bt(st)). Then, the strict
monotonicity of  and the weak monotonicity of the continuation valuation in  imply that the
1  F (bt(st)) highest types among those who have paid pt(st) win, while the others predictably
lose, and therefore would economize pt(s
t) by not expressing a demand in the rst stage of the
mechanism. Hence, strong time consistency obtains.
Assumption 1 is unnecessary in the mechanism-oer game because the principal can organize
an auction in case of \excess demand" and oer a large sum of money in case of \excess supply".
This ability to pump in money in such cases allows the principal to correct for miscoordination
issues. In the price-oer game, the principal is limited in this regard and miscoordination among
the agents could arise, vindicating the use of Assumption 1.
(ii) (b) Suppose that the principal cannot commit and rather sets a price pt(s
t) in each period.
To prove strong time consistency when T is nite and Assumption 1 holds, consider an arbitrary
perfect Bayesian equilibrium and let  Ut+1(; h
t) denote the expected continuation payo of a
type  that has not yet exited at the end of date t given the entire public history ht (which
includes the realization of st and the price pt). Let 

t (h
t) <  denote the equilibrium cuto
given history ht (if t (ht) = , the game is over anyway). Let us show by backward induction
that cuto myopia prevails: Ut+1
 
t (ht); ht

= 0. Consider date T , with previous cuto T 1 =
T 1(h
T 1). Suppose that the cuto enjoys a rent:

 
T 1 ; 

T 1 ; sT

> pT
for some sT and some optimal price pT for the principal given 

T 1 and sT . The principal's
18The exact nature of the auction is not crucial.
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date-T payo is: Z 
T 1
 
 
; T 1 ; sT

f()d + pT

1  F (T 1)

as all remaining types (  T 1) accept oer pT . But let the principal oer instead
p0T = 
 
T 1 ; 

T 1 ; sT

:
Then, p0T > pT and, from monotonicity and Assumption 1, all types   T 1 accept; and so
the principal has increased his date-T payo by
 
p0T   pT

1  F (T 1)

> 0;
a contradiction.
Now consider date T   1. The previous cuto is t 2(hT 2), the state is sT 1 and the
principal sets some price pT 1 2 support (PT 1
 
pT 2; sT 1

). Either T 1 > 

T 2, and then

 
T 2 ; 

T 1 ; sT 1
  pT 1 +  UT  T 2 ; hT 1
< 
 
T 1 ; 

T 1 ; sT 1
  pT 1 +  UT  T 1 ; hT 1  0
where the weak inequality (which is an equality if T 1 < ) results from the fact that 

T 1 is
the cuto and that the continuation valuation is monotonic in type; and so T 2 exits at date
T   1.
Or T 1 = 

T 2. From the induction hypothesis again, type 

T 2 has no continuation value
and net utility from T   1 on therefore equal to:

 
T 2 ; 

T 2; sT 1
  pT 1:
Were this utility to be strictly positive (it cannot be strictly negative, otherwise T 2 and
nearby types would exit), the principal would raise price pT 1 to p0T 1 = 
 
T 2 ; 

T 2 ; sT 1

,
still inducing no exit and raising payo.
The same reasoning shows by backward induction that the cuto type never has a strictly
positive continuation utility.
Finally, suppose that at date 0 the principal oers price p0 = 
 b0(s0); b0(s0); s0 that makes
the optimal cuto type myopically indierent between accepting and rejecting p0. The cuto 
y
0
must necessarily satisfy y0  b0(s0); for, if y0 > b0(s0), (y0 ; y0 ; s0) > p0 and so types y0 and
just below should accept p0. But if 
y
0 <
b0(s0), type y0 has negative date-0 payo and has zero
continuation utility, a contradiction. Hence y0 = b0(s0). By the same reasoning, the principal
by setting p1(s
1) = 
 b1(s1); b1(s1); s1 uniquely induces cuto y1 = b1(s1), and so forth by
induction.
(ii) (c) Allow now T = +1 and make Assumption 2 as well. Suppose that the princi-
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pal stubbornly sets a price equal to the ow valuation of the optimal cuto type bpt(st) =

 bt(st); bt(st); st for all t, st. There is no commitment to the sequence, nor is this sequence
optimal for the principal in every subform. This is simply a strategy choice that reacts to the
state of nature, but not to the observed amount of exit.
At date 0, the cuto type satises y0  b0(s0) from Assumption 1 and so types  > b0(s0)
optimally accept oer bp0(s0) regardless of the expectation concerning the continuation behavior
of the principal. Assumption 2 then implies that the principal's date-0 payo weakly exceeds
Z 
b0(s0)  
 
; b0(s0); s0f()d + bp0(s0)1  F (b0(s0)):
Similarly, at date 1, the cuto in state s1 will be some y1  b1(s1) and yield a weakly higher
payo than
Z 
b1(s1)  
 
; b1(s1); s1f()d+ bp1(s1)1 F (b1(s1), and so forth. Thus the principal
can guarantee himself the commitment payo.
Alternatively, we can focus on Markov perfect equilibria and mimic the proof of part (b).
Suppose that for some history pt < 
 
t 1; t 1; st

. Then t = t 1. But then the principal
could charge p0t = 
 
t 1; t 1; st

and still keep all   t 1 on board; and so the cuto would
remain t 1. The (random) payo-relevant state in all future periods would be unchanged and
so would continuation payos in a Markov perfect equilibrium. The principal's payo would
therefore strictly increase, a contradiction. We thus conclude that pt  
 
t 1; t 1; st

, which,
together with cuto monotonicity, implies that the cuto in a given period never enjoys a strictly
positive continuation valuation. In turn, agent myopic behavior implies that stubbornly settingbpt(st) = bt(st); bt(st); st delivers the commitment payo. 
Later on, when we search for a characterization of the non-commitment game when time
consistency obtains (Section 4), we will assume that either strong time consistency obtains, or
that the equilibrium of the no-commitment game delivering the commitment outcome is selected.
As shown in Proposition 1, this is a rather weak requirement.
3.3 Unequal time preference
Suppose, only for the sake of this section, that the principal and the agent have dierent discount
factors (A for the agent and, for comparison purposes,  for the principal). We assume that the
agent cannot commit. Lemma 1 shows that this assumption is innocuous when the two parties
are equally patient; by contrast, it is not innocuous under heterogeneous discounting: when
the agent is impatient, the agent's payments are optimally backloaded, but, as we will see, the
agent's inability to commit prevents this backloading.
Proposition 2 (unequal discount factors). Suppose that A and  dier and that the agent
cannot commit. Make Assumptions 1 and 2 and assume a nite horizon. Keeping the prin-
cipal's discount factor  xed and varying the agent's discount factor A, let V
nc(A) denote
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the principal's (unique) non-commitment payo that prevails when the principal cannot commit
either.
(i) The principal's payo does not depend on the agent's discount factor: V nc(A) = bV .
(ii) The outcome is time consistent if and only if A   (impatient or equally patient agent).
Intuitively, when the agent is impatient (A < ), the principal would like to backload the
agent's payments. The agent's lack of commitment however makes this impossible; and so the
best policy under commitment satises the cuto myopia property (see Lemma 1). The agent's
discount factor is then irrelevant since the current cuto never has a positive continuation utility.
When the agent is patient (A > ) and under commitment, the principal would like to
frontload the agent's payments. This policy however is infeasible when the principal cannot
commit; by backward induction, the principal never leaves any surplus to the previous cuto
type and again cuto myopia prevails, making the agent's discount factor irrelevant.
4 Characterization of sequential screening outcomes
Proposition 1 transforms the search for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the no-commitment
game into a simple optimization problem. This section characterizes the sequential screening
outcome in three cases of interest.
Denition 1. Let st 2 R. Dene the externality-augmented virtual surplus as
(; s)   (; ; s) 
Z 

@ 

; ; s

@
f()d
f()
:
(; s)f()d is the loss of aggregate virtual surplus if we exclude the marginal types
[;  + d] from consumption.19
In the rest of the paper, we make the following regularity assumption:
Assumption 3 (externality augmented virtual surplus).
19For example, for the examples given above
(; s) =    c  1  F (
)
f()
in the conversion game, and
(; s) =  + 2 [1  F ()] + s  c  1  F (
)
f()
in the technology disadoption game.
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(i) For all  and s,
@(; s)
@
> 0.
(ii) Furthermore, states are ranked: s 2 R, and for all  and s, @(
; s)
@s
> 0.
Part (ii) of Assumption 3 simply denes higher states as better ones. Part (i), which guaran-
tees the strict quasi-concavity in  of the function
R 
  (; 
; s)f()d, is the generalization of
the standard assumption of monotonicity of the virtual surplus to allow for externalities. It is sat-
ised in the conversion and disadoption games provided that the virtual type   [1 F ()]=f()
is increasing (for this, it suces that the Mills ratio (1   F )=f be decreasing) and network
externalities are not too strong if they are positive.
When there are no network externalities and
@ 
@
(; s)  0 (high types are valued weakly
more by the principal), a sucient condition for part (i) to be satised is:
1 

1  F ()
f()
0
1  F ()
f()

0BB@
@2
@2
@
@
1CCA (; s)
for all (; s), where the left-hand side is positive for a log-concave distribution.
4.1 Monotone attractiveness
Let us rst consider the case in which the consumption oered by the principal becomes (stochas-
tically) more or less attractive over time.
Denition 2 (monotone attractiveness). Suppose that states are ranked as in Assumption
3. Increasing (resp. decreasing) attractiveness holds when st+1  st (resp. st+1  st) for all
st+1 in the support of G conditionally on s
t.
Increasing attractiveness for example captures habit formation on the demand side and
learning by doing on the supply side. By contrast, decreasing attractiveness may result from a
decreasing interest in the incumbent consumption or gradual improvements in the alternative
option.20 Obviously, increasing and decreasing attractiveness include as a special case the case
of a constant demand.
Proposition 3 (monotone attractiveness). Let St  S  R for all t.
(i) Under deterministic increasing attractiveness (sT is a singleton), exit occurs only in the
initial period: there exists b such that at the equilibrium outcome bt(st) = b for all t.
(ii) Under decreasing attractiveness, for any (t; st; st+1) such that st+1  st, then bt+1(st+1) >bt(st) when st+1 < st. The cutos are then given by myopic principal optimization:  bt(st); st =
0 for all (t; st).
20One may here have in mind a temporary recession or lack of attractiveness of employer (bad management,
scandal).
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Proof. For a given allocation (p;), the tree (with generic element (z; sz)) can be decomposed
into the union T of disjoint subtrees S of complete subpaths over which the cuto is constant:
S 2 T () 9 (t; st) such that
(i) Ut(

t (s
t); st;p;) = 0
(ii) Ut 1(t (st); st 1;p;) > 0 (where st  st 1)
(iii) 8(z; sz) such that sz  st; z(sz) = t (st) if and only if (z; sz) 2 S:
In this denition, (t; st) is the vertex of the subtree S. The cuto, t (st), at the vertex obtains
a zero continuation utility (condition (i)), while it received a strictly positive continuation utility
(and therefore was not the cuto) earlier (condition (ii)); so t (st) is an interior cuto at date
t. The subtree is the set of (; s ) with s  st that exhibit cuto t (st) (condition (iii)).
The principal maximizes
V =
Z 

EsT
h
t=Tt=0 
tXt(; st) 
 
; t (s
t); st
i
f()d;
subject to the feasibility constraint (F ) yielding rst-order condition:21
 either the cuto is constrained by the previous one: t (st) = t 1(st 1),
 or the expected discounted virtual surplus along a constant-cuto sub-tree is equal to 0:
e t (st); st   t (st); st+ Eh=T t=0  Ift+ (st+ )=t (st)g t+ (st+ ); st+jsti = 0,
 or t (st) =  and e ; st  0,
 or t (st) =  and e ; st  0.
When the optimal cuto is not at one of the boundaries of the support of types, either
the cuto monotonicity constraint binds or we have an interior optimum. We will show that
the constraint binds at all periods under deterministic increasing attractiveness, and that the
optimum is interior in all periods under decreasing attractiveness.
(i) With a deterministic state, we can subsume the dependence of variables on the state through
a time index: t(bt). A constant-cuto sub-tree S is formed by a set of periods ft;    ; zg such
that bt =    = bz. Suppose that there are at least two such subtrees and so the cuto is not
21To obtain this rst-order condition, maximize V over fx(; );  ()g subject to the constraints:Z 

xt(; s
t)f()d  1  F (t (st))
and t+1(s
t+1)  t (st) if st+1  st.
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constant over time. Consider the rst two, from 0 to t  1 and from t to z say. One has b0 < bt
and from the previous characterization:
t 1=0 
 (b0)  0  =z=t  t (bt):
Because  (
) is weakly increasing in  for all , one necessarily has
t 1(b0)  0  t(bt);
which is inconsistent with b0 < bt and () being weakly increasing in time and strictly increasing
in the cuto. Hence, the cuto must be constant over time.
(ii) Under decreasing attractiveness (deterministic or stochastic), the principal-myopic optimum
given by (uniquely so from Assumption 3)
8(t; st) : (bt(st); st) = 0;
satises the feasibility constraints as bt+1(st+1)  bt(st) for st+1  st. It can be implemented
through prices
pt(s
t) = 
 bt(st); st: 
Remark 1. We need the assumption that the state's evolution is deterministic in part (i) of
Proposition 3. That is, it does not suce that st be stochastically increasing with time. To see
this, suppose there are only two periods and two states at date 1: s0 = s
L
1 < s
H
1 . In general,
the principal will want to keep the participation high (0 < 0) so as to keep an option value
of setting b1(sH1 ) = b0 low in state sH1 . If \disappointing" news (sL1 ) accrue, then the principal
raises the cuto to b1(sL1 ) > b0. Despite increasing attractiveness, exit is not clustered at date
0.
As pointed out by a referee, a weaker result then obtains. If st+1  st, then let st+1 =
(st; st+1) where st+1 is the supremum in the support of st+1 conditional on s
t. Then for stochastic
increasing attractiveness, bt+1(st+1) = bt(st):
Corollary 1 (sucient condition for Assumption 2 to hold). Assumption 2 (the principal
benets from a greater clientele at price pt = 
 bt(st); bt(st); st) holds provided that:
(a)
Z 

 
 
; ; s

f()d =  C(1  F (); s) with C11  0 (constant or increasing returns),
(b)  is separable in  and : 
 
; ; s

= (; s) + (; s) and Assumption 1 holds, and
(c) decreasing (including constant) attractiveness holds.
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4.2 Non-monotone attractiveness: ironing techniques
In general, attractiveness need not be monotonic. For example, a relationship may need to be
build up over time to become attractive, and is later threatened by new, external opportunities.
In this section, we will assume for simplicity that the evolution of attractiveness is deter-
ministic; so functions will be indexed only by time, and not by state st. Also for expositional
simplicity, we assume that time is continuous on [0; T ].22 Let r denote the interest rate.
With this notational simplication, the optimization program becomes:
sup
ft g
Z T
0
e rtWt(t )dt

(II)
s.t.
dt
dt
 0.
This program is highly reminiscent of that in static adverse selection models, in which a
one-dimensional allocation must be monotonic in type for incentive compatibility reasons. Here
\type" is replaced by \time" and \allocation" by \cuto". One can push the analogy further:
the decreasing attractiveness case of Section 4.1 corresponds to the \regular case" of Myerson
(1981) while the increasing attractiveness one is an extreme \non-regular case" of Myerson,
called \non-responsiveness" by Guesnerie and Laont (1984) and giving rise to \full pooling".
More generally, the optimal allocation can be obtained through the convex analysis used in
Myerson and Guesnerie-Laont. Because the only contribution of this section is to identify
the formal analogy between the two problems and use it to characterize dynamic screening, we
content ourselves with stating the result.
Proposition 4 (ironing for non-monotone deterministic attractiveness). Assume that
attractiveness is deterministic; that Wt is strictly concave in 

t and is C
2; that the C1 solution
t of dWt=d

t = t(
t) = 0 is such that dt=dt changes sign a nite number of times.
Then the solution to program (II) exists, is unique and exhibits a nite number of points of
discontinuity. bt coincides with t except on a nite numbers of intervals (tk; tk+1) such that bt
is constant on each of these intervals andZ tk+1
tk
e rtt(bt)dt = 0:
The evolution of the cut-o is depicted in Figure 2(a), which is also familiar from static
incentive theory.
22See the beginning of the proof of Proposition 3 for the discrete-time version of the ironing condition.
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(a) General pattern (b) Product life cycle with vintage-based
price discrimination
Figure 2
Under deterministic attractiveness, one would thus expect episodes of gradual exit alternating
with exit-less periods.
Remark (product life cycle). In some environments, attractiveness is likely to conform to a
simple U -shaped pattern. For example, a new product may face the following life cycle. At
introduction it may be relatively unattractive: bugs still need to be xed, network externalities
are still limited by the small goodwill, etc. The rm must then oer very advantageous conditions
to attract customers. Then, the product becomes more and more attractive, until time t0, at
which a viable competition enters and slowly erodes the product's installed base of consumers.
The prediction for such life cycles is that the clientele is built through very advantageous
conditions and remains steady until it declines over time. One implication is unpalatable for this
industrial organization example: the clientele is built overnight. To obtain a more gradual build-
up of clientele, though, one may generalize the model and assume that consumers are made aware
or arrive in the market in dierent, but similar cohorts, as in Section 4.3 below. Proposition 4
holds all the same as long as the rm can practice vintage-based price discrimination (Figure
2(b)), for which the aggregation of cohorts yields an increasing and then decreasing demand.
When vintage-based price discrimination is infeasible, things become more complex (see part
(ii) of Proposition 7), but backward induction techniques from the date t0 at which the product
becomes less attractive can still be employed to yield a similar pattern of demand evolution.
4.3 Transient shocks
Suppose now that the realizations of the shocks st are identically and independently distributed
over time. Let g(st) and G(st) denote the density and the cumulative distribution of the shock.
We assume that the horizon is innite, so as to provide a simpler characterization of the equi-
librium outcome.23
23A similar characterization is available by backward induction for a nite T , but the strategy then depends on
the length of the remaining horizon.
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Proposition 5 (transient shocks). Suppose that shocks are identically and independently
distributed with density g() and that T = +1. The optimal outcome is characterized by: for
all (t; st) bt(st) = u min
t
s

;
where u(s), a decreasing function of s, is uniquely dened by H(u(s)) = 0 where
H(; s)  (; s) + 
1  [1 G(s)]
Z 1
s
(; ~s)g(~s)d~s;
if H(; s)  0  H(; s), and u(s) =  if H(; s)  0 and u(s) =  if H(; s)  0.
Proof. Maximizing V with respect to xt(; s
t) yields the rst-order condition
xt(; s
t) = 1 () (; st) + Es1jst

1=t+1
 tXt+1(; s
 )(; s )
  0
where Xt+1(; s
 )  xt+1(; st+1)   x (; s ). Note that if Xt 1(; st 1) = 0, then the rst-
order condition is irrelevant, but one can still impose this date-t rst-order condition without
loss of generality. Because  is strictly increasing in , there is a unique threshold bt(st) in
[; ] for each st such that this condition is satised if and only if   bt(st). The stationarity
of the problem then suggests looking for a strictly decreasing cuto bt(st) = u(st) (where \u"
stands for \unconstrained by the previous exit pattern"). Noting that Xt+1(
u(st); s
 ) = 0 if
min fst+1 ;    ; sg < st, such a cuto then satises (if interior, i.e., in (; )):
(u(s); s) + 
"Z 1
s
(u(s); ~s)g(~s)d~s+ [1 G(s)]
h Z 1
s

 
u(s); ~s

g(~s)d~s+   
i#
= 0
or
(u(s); s) +

1  [1 G(s)]
Z 1
s
(u(s); ~s)g(~s)d~s = 0:
Dierentiating this condition and using it to eliminate two terms, one obtains:
@
@s
+

@
@
+

1  [1 G(s)]
Z 1
s
@
@
g(~s)d~s

du
ds
= 0
and so
du
ds
< 0:
The tentative solution bt(st) = max
t

u(s )
	
= u
 
min
t
s

indeed satises the rst-order condition above. 
Corollary 2 (testable predictions for transient shocks). With transient shocks and an
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innite horizon, let for all t, st 1
Vt = F

u
 
min
t
s
  Fu min
t 1
s

denote the volume of exit at date t. Then the following properties hold for all  > t:
(i) Decreasing exit: E

Vtjst 1
  EV jst 1.
(ii) Negative serial correlation:
@
@Vt
Et

V jst 1;Vt

< 0.
Proof. Let s^  min
t 1
s ; and let gn(s)  ng(s)[1 G(s)]n 1 denote the density of the distribution
of the minimum realization over n periods.
(i) Then
E
h
V jst 1
i
=
Z 1
s^
h Z s^
 1
h
F
 
u(~s)
  F  u(s^)ig(~s)d~sig t(s)ds
+
Z s^
 1
h Z s
 1
h
F
 
u(~s)
  F  u(s)ig(~s)d~sig t(s)ds

Z s^
 1
h
F
 
u(~s)
  F  u(s^)ig(~s)d~s = EVtjst 1:
(ii) Note that E

V jst 1

depends only on, and is increasing with s^; and that E

V jst 1;Vt

=
E

V jmin fs^; stg

. Because Vt is (weakly) decreasing in st, then E

V jst 1;Vt

is weakly de-
creasing in Vt, and strictly so when Vt > 0. 
5 Robustness
The section provides several robustness results by allowing inows of new agents and nite
re-entry costs.
5.1 Finite re-entry costs
We have assumed so far that re-entry costs were innite. In practice, though, except in the
case of apostasy, reestablishing a relationship is costly, but not innitely so. Although the
very reasons why the relationship broke up in the rst place and the investments made in the
meantime in alternative relationships hinder such reintegration, we see customers returning to
brands they dropped, spouses remarrying their divorced partner or employees being reemployed
by their abandoned employer.
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Intuitively, our results should carry over for large re-entry costs. We may then wonder, how
large is \large"? This section sheds some light on this question. We generalize the model by
considering an unchanged ow payo for the agent while the principal's ow payo is reduced
by the expected re-entry cost:
Z 

max

0; (xt()  xt 1())r
	
f()d;
where r  0 is the re-entry cost incurred at date t whenever xt = 1 and xt 1 = 0. For expositional
simplicity, we assume that r represents a cost that is borne by the principal (this assumption
also allows us to abstract from the possibility that the principal lowers the price substantially
in order to attract re-entrants, who might then fake re-entry { i.e., not spend r{ and thereby
\take the money/surplus and run"). We assume that there is a continuum of agents, and that
the principal cannot price discriminate (i.e., he charges a uniform price pt in each period).
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Proposition 6 (re-entry). Suppose that exit is not necessarily denitive: re-entry involves
cost r  0.
(i) Under decreasing/constant attractiveness, for all r  0, payo bV without re-entry is still an
equilibrium payo with re-entry, (the unique one if T is nite and Assumption 1 is satised).
(ii) Under deterministic,25 strictly increasing attractiveness, equilibrium payo bV without re-
entry is still an equilibrium payo with re-entry, provided that r  r for some r computed in
Appendix D (again, the unique one if T is nite and Assumption 1 is satised).
Intuitively, the principal wants to shed goodwill when the relationship becomes less attrac-
tive, and so would not want to incur a re-entry cost, however small, to bring back agents who
have quit in the past. By contrast, under increasing attractiveness, the principal might want the
agent to re-enter later on. The re-entry cost must then be suciently large for the absorbing-exit
solution to prevail.
5.2 Inow of new agents
We have so far assumed that all agents are present at date 0. Suppose by contrast that at each
date t, a new cohort of agents enters, that (as in Conlisk et al (1984) and Sobel (1991)'s durable
goods models with negative selection) has the same type distribution F () as previous ones.26
Newcomers, who live from date t through date T , have a chance to interact with the principal
at date t. Non-membership at the entry date is, like exit, an absorbing state.
24With a single agent and, say, r small, a ratchet eect would arise: an early rejection by the agent would lead
to a price cut relative to an early acceptance. Similarly, ratcheting might occur with a continuum of agents and
price discrimination between the installed base and re-entrants.
25The analysis can be generalized to a stochastic environment, but at the expense of increased notational
complexity.
26We want to abstract from the standard issues associated with the impact of third-degree price discrimination
under heterogeneous submarkets (see, e.g., Aguirre et al 2010 for a recent entry on this topic).
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To abstract from direct interactions among cohorts, assume that there are no cross-cohorts
network externalities (there can be within-cohort network externalities) and that returns to
scale are constant; otherwise the virtual surplus for a given cohort would depend on the number
of retained agents in the other cohorts. To capture these requirements, we thus assume that
the function  is invariant to the presence of other cohorts, and so the only interaction among
cohorts is through pricing.27 If the principal is able to price discriminate among cohorts, each
cohort is then treated in isolation and the previous analysis, including that of time consistency,
applies. Rather, we ask whether time consistency still holds when the principal is constrained
to practise uniform pricing.28
Proposition 7 (inow of new agents). Suppose that each period t = 0; 1;    ; T , a new cohort
of arbitrary mass and type distribution F () arrives. Suppose that  is invariant to the presence
of other cohorts (no cross-cohorts network externalities and no returns to scale). For the class
of monotone-attractiveness games considered in Proposition 3:
(i) Under commitment, uniform pricing does as well for the principal as discriminatory pricing.
(ii) Weak29 time consistency obtains for decreasing/constant attractiveness, but not for determin-
istic, strictly increasing attractiveness.
Proof. It will be convenient to consider sequentially the cases of decreasing/constant attractive-
ness and of strictly increasing attractiveness.
Under decreasing/constant attractiveness, the optimal policy for cohort t when price dis-
crimination is feasible (see Proposition 3) is given by myopic optimization:

 bt(st); bt(st); st = 0 for all (t; st):
Thus the cuto bt(st) is independent of the cohort and can be implemented by cohort indepen-
dent price
pt(s
t) = 
 bt(st); bt(st); st:
Furthermore, the function  is left invariant by left truncations,30 and so the price path just
dened is time consistent.
27More precisely, we assume that the principal's intertemporal payo V is separable across cohorts. Let c 2
f0; 1;    ; Tg denote a cohort, with mass c. Let Xtc(; st) denote the probability that type  of cohort c has not
exited yet at t  c in state st. Similarly, t;c(st) is the date-t cuto for cohort c. Then
V = c=Tc=0 c
Z 

EsT
h
t=Tt=c 
tXtc(; s
t) 
 
; t;c(s
t); st
i
f()d;
28There has been substantial interest in the literature on negative selection regarding the impact of the arrival
of new cohorts under uniform pricing (Conlisk et al 1984 and Sobel 1991 are classic references here).
29Strong time consistency can be obtained through further assumptions as in Proposition 1. We focus on weak
time consistency for conciseness.
30For example, when cohorts have equal sizes, at date t, the posterior cumulative over the (t + 1) existing
cohorts is:
Ft() =
F ()
1 + t

1  F  t 1 for   t 1 and Ft() = 1  (t+ 1)[1  F ()]1 + t1  F  t 1 for   t 1.
30
Next, we consider the case of deterministic, strictly increasing attractiveness. We rst want
to show that uniform pricing does as well as discriminatory pricing. Given that attractiveness
increases over time, the generation t cuto will enjoy future rents under uniform pricing. To
cancel these rents, the principal ought to frontload the payment pattern. More precisely, under
price discrimination, the optimal policy for each cohort t consists in a constant cuto b(t) dened
by (using the notation  of the proof of Proposition 3):
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=T=t 
 t 
 b(t) = 0:
Because st is strictly increasing, b(t) is strictly decreasing.32
Let
Pt  =T=t  t 
 b(t); b(t); s
denote the present discounted value of the cohort-t marginal type's surplus. Pt also represents
what cohort t will have to pay for membership from t through T . Let pt be dened by Pt =
pt + Pt+1. Then
pt  
 b(t); b(t); st+=T=t+1  th b(t); b(t); s   b(t+ 1); b(t+ 1); si:
The second term on the right-hand side of this expression of pt is the present discounted rent
of the cohort-t marginal type and is strictly positive. The dierence pt   
 b(t); b(t); st thus
measures the required frontloading of the payment that delivers cuto b(t) for generation t. The
price sequence fptg generates cuto sequence fb(t)g.33
Finally, suppose that there is no commitment and that the principal charges uniform prices.
Is the sequence fptg dened above an equilibrium of the non-commitment game? To see that
this is not the case, consider the two-period version of the model: t = 0; 1 and assume for
notational simplicity that there are no network externalities, even within a cohort. Necessarily,
for time consistency to obtain,
p1 = 
 b(1); s1
and
p0 + p1 = 
 b(0); s0+  b(0); s1:
Furthermore (recalling the assumption of no network externalities and constant returns to scale,
so  =  )

 b(1); s1+   b(1); s1  @
@
 b(1); s1 1  F (b(1))
f(b(1)) = 0
31For conciseness, we assume interior solutions ( < b(t) < ). The result however does not hinge on this
assumption.
32=T=t 
 t 
 b(t) = 0 =) =T=t+1  (t+1)  b(t) > 0. Hence if b(t+ 1)  b(t),
=Tt=t+1 
 (t+1) 
 b(t+ 1) > 0;
a contradiction.
33It is unique if T is nite. We conjecture that it is also unique if T is innite.
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and
=1=0 

h

 b(0); s+   b(0); s  @
@
 b(0); s 1  F (b(0))
f(b(0))
i
= 0:
Because b(0) > b(1), the principal's date-1 payo in the neighborhood of p1 =  b(1); s1 is,
letting t denote the weight of cohort t and 

1(p1) be dened by p1 = 
 
1(p1); s1

:
p1
h
1 [1  F (1(p1))] + 0
h
1  F (b(0))i i
+ 1
Z 
1(p1)
 (; s1)f()d + 0
Z 
b(0)  (; s1)f()d:
The derivative at p1 = 
 b(1); s1 is strictly positive, reecting the fact that the demand of
cohort 0 is locally inelastic. Thus the principal cannot obtain the commitment payo. 
6 Time inconsistency
This section is devoted to the analysis of dynamic screening with positive selection in environ-
ments that do not satisfy the conditions for time consistency.
For the remainder of the paper, we will alleviate notation by making
Assumption 4 (no network externalities).
@ 
@
(; ; s) = 0 for all (; s).
By an abuse of notation, we omit the variable  as an argument of  and  . Note also that
  =  under Assumption 4. The absence of network externalities plays no major role in the
results to come.
6.1 Shifting principal type
Sometimes the principal's preferences may change over time. Indeed, in the conversion game,
Muslim rulers exhibited varying degrees of piousness, altering the trade-o between tax receipts
and adherence to the Muslim faith. Let t 2 R denote the date-t principal's type, which is
assumed to aect only the principal's objective function  and not the agent's utility . We
assume that  is strictly increasing in , which will imply that a high  principal prefers a lower
cuto compared with a low  one.
We assume that the realizations of st and t are public information at the beginning of
date t; otherwise the principal's price might signal his type. The parameters st and t follow
independent stochastic processes and dier in that the date-t principal's payo from date-
agent participation for  > t is (under Assumption 4)  (; s ; t) as opposed to  (; s ;  ) for
the date- principal. That is, temporal variations in t capture the change in the principal's
preferences over time and will be the source of conict among principals; by contrast, st is the
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mere evolution of the part of the rest of the state. Thus, the date-t principal's objective function
is:
Vt(s
t; t) =
Z 
t 1(st 1;t 1)
EsT ;T
h
T=t
 tX (; s ;  ) 
 
; s ; t
 " f()
1  F  t 1(st 1; t 1)
#
d
i
Obviously, the principal's commitment policy in general will not be time consistent. Nonethe-
less simple equilibrium solutions again are available. Let us assume that the state (s; ) 2 R2,
follows a rst-order Markov process Gs(st+1jst) G(t+1jt) with full support. Suppose that
@ =@s > 0 and that the virtual surplus
 (; s; ) = (; s) +  (; s; )  @(; s)
@
1  F ()
f()
is strictly increasing in  (this is Assumption 3 applied to this context). It is a also increasing
in  because   is.
Suppose, rst, that the \time-consistent" part of the state, st, is constant (only the principal's
type varies over time). Intuitively, when inducing a cut-o at date t, type t constrains, but
is not aected by future choices of types 0 > t. By contrast, he is aected by future choices
of types 0 < t, but cannot do anything about it (altering these choices would require making
future cutos even higher, while they are already too high). For example, a muslim ruler cares
about the exact religiousity of future rulers who will be more pious than he is, but not about
that of less religious ones.
Proposition 8 (shifting principal type, invariant environment). Suppose that only the
principal's type changes over time: st = s for all t, that the virtual surplus   is strictly increasing
in , and make Assumption 4.
Let  be dened by  =  if  (; s; )  0,  =  if  
 
; s; 
  0 and     ; s;  = 0
otherwise. That is,  is the optimal cuto for principal type . There exists a Markov perfect
equilibrium of the game such that on the equilibrium path the cuto is at each point of time the
optimal cuto for the least eager principal so far:
t = 

min
t
fg
Proof. Note that
M(; ) 
Z 

  (; s; ) f()d
is strictly quasi-concave with maximum at  . Furthermore  is weakly decreasing in .
Consider an arbitrary date  and history h 1  (0;    ;  1 ; p0;    ; p 1) at that date.
Let ^(p0;    ; p 1) be dened by the solution to (; s) = max fp0;    ; p 1g (if interior; oth-
erwise ^ =  if (; s)  max fp0;    ; p 1g and ^ =  if (; s)  max fp0;    ; p 1g) Suppose
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that at date  , principal  sets
p = 

max

 ; ^
 
p0;    ; p 1
	
; s

;
and that the agent behaves myopically (x (; h
 ) = 1 if and only if (; s)  p ). Consider the
date-t principal, with type t. Then
(i) either t  ^
 
p0;    ; pt 1

and then for all  such that min ft+1 ;    ; g  t ,M
 
t ; t
 
M (z ; t) for z 2 ft + 1;    ; g and so t provides a higher utility for such realizations. By
contrast, consider ( > t;  ) such that  < t. Then any alternative cuto 

t   would have
no impact on the date- cuto. And if t < minft+1 ; ;zg raising 

t at the margin improves
type t's welfare from the quasi-concavity of M .
(ii) or t < ^
 
p0;    ; pt 1

. If ^
 
p0;    ; pt ; pt+1;    ; p

= ^
 
p0;    ; pt

<  the quasi-
concavity of M and the fact that ^ is weakly increasing in pt implies that any increase in pt
above ^
 
p0;    ; pt

would reduce prot not only at date t but also at dates t+ 1;    ;  . And if
^
 
p0;    ; pt ; pt+1;    ; p

= min ft+1; ;zg, we are back to case (i). We thus conclude that the
proposed strategies indeed form an equilibrium. 
The next result allows the non-principal-related part of the state, st , to evolve over time,
making the relationship either increasingly attractive or increasingly unattractive.
Let ^t;t denote the optimal date-t cuto for principal t as characterized in Proposition
3. That is, the cuto is that which would prevail in the thought experiment in which (a) the
principal's type remains t for the rest of the game and (b) this principal is unconstrained by
previous truncations of the distribution (t 1 = , say): Thus, ^t;t is the cuto that would
prevail in a dierent game in which both the principal and the agent both believed that  = t
for all  > t.
Proposition 9 (shifting principal type, deterministic monotone attractiveness). Sup-
pose that st 2 R, @ =@s > 0, @ =@ > 0 and Assumption 4 holds. Then there exists an
equilibrium and a sequence t;t such that the cuto 

t induced by principal t at date t is
max

t 1; t;t
	
where
t;t  ^t;t under either increasing attractiveness (st increasing)
or decreasing attractiveness (st decreasing),
where ^t;t is the cuto that would be selected by a date-t principal with type t, were the future
principals also to have type t.
Proposition 9 says that there is too little retention going forward from the point of view of
all successive principals. Interestingly, the reason why this is so is not the same for increasing
and decreasing demand. Under increasing attractiveness the principal exerts cuto moderation
when having a constant type as he expects that he will prefer wider participation in the future.
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Cuto moderation is like an investment, but with changing type, the investment has a lower
value as the cuto in future periods may be raised by less eager (lower ) types. Under decreas-
ing attractiveness, the date-t principal would myopically raise the cuto over time if he were
permanent (Proposition 3). Increasing the cuto a bit above the myopic optimum is benecial
as this commits future, more eager (higher ) types.
6.2 Multiple principals: retention as a dynamically provided public good
The agent's decision to exit often depends on the behavior of multiple principals rather than a
single one. Retention in a work, volunteering, sports or religious community relies on the joint
eorts by its members to make staying a comfortable option for the member. Immigration deci-
sions similarly may be guided by a mixture of policies enacted by local and national authorities,
workplace atmosphere, overall society openness, and so forth.
This section studies environments in which n principals each set a \price" every period for
that period, and the agent's continuation decision is guided by the sum of those prices. Such
environments are not conducive to time consistency since under commitment each principal
might want to commit to relatively high prices in order to force other principals to bear the
brunt of the retention eort in the future.34
Suppose that there are n symmetrical principals with surplus  (; st)=n each (so as to keep
total surplus the same). At date t, the principals simultaneously set prices pit; principal i's ow
payo given resulting cuto it is then
pit

1  F (t )

+
Z 
t
 (; st)
n
f()d:
Provided that he does not exit, the agent's ow payo is
(; st)  ni=1 pit:
We will be focusing on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria in which the agent behaves my-
opically :
t = t 1 if (t 1; st)  ni=1 pit
t =  if (; st)  ni=1 pit
or, if the solution is interior:
(t ; st) = 
n
i=1 p
i
t:
Markov behavior means that the vector of prices charged at date t, fpitgnt=1 depends only on
the previous cuto t 1 and on the current state st (provided that the state follows a rst-order
34This environment is dierent from that studied by Admati and Perry (1991) and the literature they initiated.
Admati and Perry consider a cumulative-contribution game in which n players make sequential commitments
toward assembling a xed amount needed to implement a project. There is no strategic agent involved, and a
fortiori no screening of the agents' information.
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Markov process, or more generally on a statistics for the history of states that is a sucient
statistics for describing current and future payos). Furthermore, pit = pt for all i and all
histories of the game.
The following assumption is the counterpart of Assumption 3 in the common agency context:
Assumption 5. For all (; s)
@
@

(; s) +  (; s)  n1  F ()
f()
@
@
(; s)

> 0
We furthermore assume that states are ordered: s 2 R and
@
@s

(; s) +  (; s)  n1  F ()
f()
@
@
(; s)

> 0:
Proposition 10 (common agency). Under Assumptions 4 and 5, a symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium with myopic agent behavior exists and has the following properties:
(i) Under deterministic increasing attractiveness, exit occurs only in the initial period: there
exists  such that t (st) =  for all t. Furthermore
t=Tt=0 
t
h
(; st) +  (; st)  n1  F (
)
f()
@
@
(; st)
i
= 0:
(ii) Under (possibly stochastic) decreasing attractiveness, the cutos t = t (st) are increasing
over time and satisfy for all (t; st):
(t ; st) +  (

t ; st) = n
1  F (t )
f(t )
@
@
(t ; st):
Proposition 10 can be viewed as a generalization of Cournot nth marginalization and more
generally the static common-agency-with-private-information literature35 to dynamic games of
exit/retention. When demand is increasing, all exit occurs in the rst period, like in the single-
principal case; retention is a collective investment and free riding implies that there is less
retention than if the principals coordinated their price choices. When demand is decreasing by
contrast, exit occurs progressively and the remaining installed base is determined by the static
Cournot nth marginalization condition. It again involves insucient retention.
Proof. Let us rst consider the \unconstrained optimization" at date t; that is, one considers
the thought experiment in which no exit has yet occurred at date t (t 1 = ). Of course, cuto
monotonicity is imposed from date t on. Let t(s
t) be dened like in Proposition 10, but for the
game starting at t with no exit prior to date t; t(s
t) satises:
=T=t 

h
(t(s
t); s ) +  (t(s
t); s )  n1  F (
t(s
t))
f(t(st))
@
@
(t(s
t); s )
i
= 0;
35See Martimort and Stole (2015) for a state-of-the-art contribution to this literature (the retention game
roughly corresponds to a dynamic extension of their \congruent preferences" case).
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under deterministic increasing attractiveness, and
(t(s
t); st) +  (t(s
t); st)  n1  F (
t(s
t))
f(t(st))
@
@
(t(s
t); st) = 0
under decreasing attractiveness.
Consider the following Markov strategies. Principals all charge price pit = (t ; st)=n where
t = max

t 1; bt	. And the agent behaves myopically, as described just prior to the statement
of the Proposition. Assumption 5 guarantees that provided that other principals charge (t ; st),
each principal's ow payo is strictly quasi-concave in the cuto.
Consider rst decreasing attractiveness. The strict quasi-concavity of the instantaneous
payo in the cuto implies that a deviation from the presumed price reduces the principal's
current payo; the deviation has no impact at date  > t in state s provided that the induced
cuto t satises t   (s ). Furthermore if  (s ) < t , then the date-t deviation also reduces
the date- payo. The proof for increasing attractiveness follows the same steps. 
6.3 Time inconsistency arising on agent side
Section 6.1 and 6.2 investigated environments in which time inconsistency originates on the
principal's side: Either the principal's preferences change over time or there are multiple prin-
cipals in each period. We leave the more complex cases of time inconsistency originating on the
agent side for future research; we point out, however that the simplicity of positive selection
environments makes us hopeful that interesting and tractable characterizations will be available.
The factors of time-inconsistency on the agent's side mirror those on the principal's side: the
agent's tastes may change (here in an unobservable way) over time; and there may be multiple
agents forming a team that will be dissolved if any of them quits.
Let us start this discussion with the former. The framework so far rules out the case of
a \shifting type" for the agent (for which asymmetries of information may be reduced over
time), on which many of the recent advances on dynamic mechanisms design have focused.
Time consistency of the optimal commitment policy is then not to be expected. Intuitively, the
principal might want to promise low (and ecient) future prices in exchange of a higher price
today. However, price frontloading is not conducive to time consistency.36
One therefore can no longer rely on solving an optimal control problem to obtain a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the no-commitment environment. Nonetheless, explicit derivations may
be available. One simple such case arises when the agent's type is redrawn in each period in an
i.i.d. manner from a known distribution. Both the principal and the agent then have (stationary
if T = +137) continuation option values. Appendix F shows that the derivation of the (unique)
36Pavan et al (2014) stress, \because of the serial correlation of types, it is optimal to distort allocations
not only in the initial period, but at every history at which the agent's type is responsive to his initial type,
as measured by the impulse response function." This memorization of past, now-payo-irrelevant types in the
optimal commitment allocation makes the commitment solution time-inconsistent.
37Appendix F focuses on the case of a Markov perfect equilibrium.
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Markov perfect equilibrium is straightforward. Much work remains to be done, though, to study
the more likely case of imperfect, but non-zero correlation over time, which has been the focus
of the commitment literature.
Second, one can analyze the case of partnerships. A partnership dissolves if any of its
members quits. The \Myerson-Satterthwaite platform", whether benevolent or for prot, that
arranges the conditions for the team of agents to operate, must then keep all members on board.
Membership, though, is no longer a 0=1 decision as in the rest of the paper. From Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983), we know that ecient partnerships correspond to a set  of types
that is not rectangular: whether type i should be in depends on the other agents' types. And
therefore, each agent's information about other agents' types drawn from the mere continuation
of the relationship necessarily varies with the agent's own type.
The on-line appendix proves a limited, but nonetheless interesting result: there is no ecient
and time-consistent allocation such that the agents learn at the end of each period only whether
the relationship continues or not. The analysis of repeated Myerson-Satterthwaite relationships
is a major item on the research agenda.
7 Alleys for future research
This paper provides rst insights on repeated relationships with positive selection. The main
ones were summarized in the introduction. This conclusion therefore focuses on future research.
The rst front is empirical: environments with positive selection are as untested as they are
theoretically investigated; yet, this paper and subsequent research provides (will provide) clear
empirical patterns that ought to guide empirical research in this area. Second, at least six broad
areas of research on the theoretical front seem worth pursuing.
First, we saw that shifting types, common agency and partnerships all disconnect the res-
olution of the dynamic screening game from the simple optimization problem associated with
commitment. While we showed that the simple structure of screening with positive selection
allows for interesting characterizations, much work remains to be done in order to obtain general
predictions for these environments. In particular, we have hardly scratched the surface when
discussing environments in which time inconsistency originates on the agent's side.
Second, the model should be generalized to allow for competition among principals. Firms
compete for employees and consumers, department for professors, religions for followers, munic-
ipalities and countries for plants and headquarters, languages for speakers, and so forth, and
principals and their agents are engaged as in this paper in relationships of endogenous lengths. A
richer model would formalize not only the retention policies studied here (human resource man-
agement, customer relationship management, evolution of nancial and non-nancial terms),
but also how mobility aects the policies of competing principals and the agents' reservation
utilities attached to splitting from their principal.
Third, the model could be enriched in several dimensions. It is hard to predict without
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further inquiry whether these extensions will deliver insights that go beyond a mere combination
of existing insights. But it seems for example worthwhile to add private information held by the
principal. The commitment case would involve mechanism design by an informed principal, and
the non-commitment case repeated signaling. One could then study the role of commitment in
this enlarged framework. Similarly, we assumed (nite or innite) re-entry costs to be exogenous.
While this assumption may be reasonable in a number of contexts, one could also allow the
principal or the agent to impact this re-entry cost.
Fourth, our model captures the dynamics of relationships when exit is absorbing due to large
re-entry costs (as we have seen, \how large" re-entry costs must be depends on the evolution
of the relationship's attractiveness). More generally, one might have in mind that relationships
must be cultivated; shared routines, a common history and understanding, learning by doing
make relationships that have been activated in the past more attractive, although not in a
discontinuous way as in this paper's model. This could be captured by a state variable st that
would depend not only on exogenous events, but also on the discounted intensity of previous
relationships between the principal and the agent. This approach would yield an interesting
characterization of second-degree price-discrimination dynamics.
Fifth, the extension of the analysis to multi-sided markets would enhance our theoretical and
empirical understanding of platform dynamics. For example, platforms' life-cycle (the two-sided
extension of Section 4.2) would be worth of investigation. I conjecture, but have not veried,
that as long as the platform can charge membership fees, the platform's commitment outcome
is time consistent under conditions similar to those derived in Proposition 1. It would also be
interesting to analyse the case of pure usage fees and investigate whether cuto myopia would
still prevail then.
Finally, the paradigm should be enlarged to accommodate political economy considerations.
In a number of environments (such as religions or rms), the principal's preferences can be taken
as exogenous in a rst approximation. However, as Dewatripont and Roland (1992) stress, the
principal's preferences may result from a vote or power relationships, and therefore change
with the composition of the in- and out-groups; for instance, religious conversions may aect
the balance of political power and quits may have a long-lasting eect on the orientation of an
academic department. Political economy considerations add a new form of (positive or negative)
network externalities, which are intrinsically dynamic rather than contemporaneous.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the price sequence p dened in the statement of the lemma.
(i) Note rst that this sequence leaves no rent to the lowest type: U() = 0. We must show
that if the cuto delivered by the sequence of short-term prices are exactly the cutos b that
obtain under commitment it is indeed in individual agents' interest to behave in a way that
gives rise to cutos b. Note rst that for types  > bt(st), not exiting at date t in state st is
a dominant strategy as they enjoy a strictly positive instantaneous surplus and can always exit
later on. Now consider a type  < bt(st). Because the cuto sequence is necessarily monotonic,
p > (; b (s ); s ) for all   t and so not exiting delivers a strictly negative payo.
(ii) To demonstrate uniqueness under Assumption 1, suppose that there exists (t; st) such that
t (st) 6= bt(st) (the equilibrium cuto diers from the optimal cuto). If t (st) < bt(st), then
from Assumption 1, (t (st); t (st); st)   pt(st) < 0. Hence there must exist ( > t; s  st)
such that x (

t (s
t); s ) = 1 (and so t (st) is still the cuto at (; s )) and

 
t (s
t); t (s
t); s
  p (s ) > 0;
and so (from Assumption 1), t (st) > b (s ), contradicting the monotonicity of the optimal
cuto sequence. If t (st) > bt(st), then from Assumption 1,

 
t (s
t); t (s
t); st
  pt(st) > 0:
Then there must exist (  t; s - st) such that  1(s 1) < t (st) and  (s ) = +1(s+1) =
   = t (st). Furthermore,

 
 (s
 );  (s
 ); s
  p (s ) > 0
from Assumption 1 and the monotonicity of the sequence b(). But then  (s ) cannot be the
cuto at (; s ) since it is a strictly dominant strategy for  (s )  " (for " small and positive)
to stay at (; s ). 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
For notational simplicity only we will assume that the path of the state st is deterministic.
(i) Impatient agent (A  ). Consider the optimal allocation when the principal can commit
and the agent cannot. Let ft gt=0;:::;T denote the sequence of optimal cutos and fptgt=0;:::;T
the contributions. Because the agent cannot commit, these cutos must satisfy
 (T ; 

T ; sT )  pT  0;

 
T 1; 

T 1; sT 1
  pT 1 + Amax0;   T 1; T ; sT   pT	  0
: : :
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Fix the cutos and optimize the principal's payo (whose expression is the same as earlier,
because we have taken  to be the principal's discount factor) with respect to payments. Suppose
that  (T ; 

T ; sT ) > pT . Then, consider new payments (p^T 1; p^T ) such that
p^T 1 + Ap^T = pT 1 + ApT
and
p^T =  (

T ; 

T ; sT ) :
The new cutos satisfy ^T = 

T and ^

T 1  T 1. From Assumption 2 and A  , the
principal's payo is increased. Repeat this reasoning; backward induction then shows that at
the optimal allocation, the contributions satisfy:
pt =  (

t ; 

t ; st) for all t:
Finally, the agent's discount factor is irrelevant under cuto myopia as the cuto's continuation
valuation is always equal to 0. Hence V nc(A) = bV .
(ii) Patient agent (A > ). Suppose that the principal cannot commit. Then any price pT <
 (T ; 

T ; sT ) is strictly suboptimal; hence pT =  (

T ; 

T ; sT ). By backward induction, cuto
myopia prevails on the equilibrium path, and so again A is irrelevant. But the commitment
solution is not time-consistent: The principal would like to frontload payments, which requires
commitment, as already noted in the text. 
Appendix C. Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose that  
 
; ; s

=  C1(1  F (); s) and so:Z 

 
 
; ; s

f()d =  C(1  F (); s) + C(0; s). Then Assumption 2 is equivalent to

 bt(st); bt(st); st  C1 1  F (); st
for all   bt(st). Now if C11  0, this is satised provided that

 bt(st); bt(st); st  C1 1  F (bt(st)); st:
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When  is separable (
 
; ; s
  (; s) + (; s)), the condition  bt(st); bt(st); st = 0 (see
part (ii) of Proposition 2) takes the following form at  = bt(st) and s = st:

 
; ; s
  C1 1  F (); s = 1  F ()
f()
1(
; s) +
Z 

1(
; s)f()d
f()
=
1  F ()
f()

1(
; s) + 1(; s)
  0
under (a) and (b). 
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 6
Let bt(st) denote the optimal cuto for innite re-entry costs.
(i) Under decreasing/constant attractiveness, when the principal charges pt = 
 bt(st), bt(st); st
for all (t; st) with (bt(st); st) = 0 (bt here depends on st only through st) and so bt(st)  bt(st 1),
the agent has no incentive to exit to later re-enter. The principal cannot obtain more than bV ,
because even for r = 0 the commitment outcome is fbt(st)gt;st . To show uniqueness when T is -
nite and Assumption 1 is satised, note that the strict quasi-concavity of the instantaneous prot
function (Assumption 3) and backward induction from the end of the horizon imply that for any
nite re-entry cost, for all (t; st), the principal induces cuto t (st) = max

^t(s
t); t 1(st 1)
	
and charges pt = (

t (s
t); t (st); st).
(ii) By contrast, with increasing attractiveness, for r small, the principal might want the agent
to exit and re-enter later on. The solution takes the following form (we write it for simplicity in
the case of no network externalities; and as earlier we omit the state in the deterministic case
and just index functions by time). Let T () be dened by (if not equal to 0 or +1):
 T ()()  (1  )r >  T () 1():
In words, T () is type 's optimal re-entry date, if any. Re-entry however can be strictly optimal
only if two conditions hold. First re-entry must be protable relative to exit at date 0 and no
re-entry:
t=Tt=T () 
t  t() > 
T ()r:
Second, it must be protable relative to no exit at date 0:
 t=T () 1t=0 t  t() > T ()r:
So if
r  max
fg
h
min
n
t=Tt=T () 
t T () t() ;  t=T () 1t=0 t T () t()
oi
 r;
the optimum involves no re-entry. The rst term in the min is increasing in  and the second
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term decreasing.38 Thus r  t=T
t=T (b)t T (b) t(b) where b is uniquely dened by t=Tt=0 t t(b) = 0.
Note nally that even if r < r, the commitment solution still resembles that of the absorbing
exit paradigm: Types    never exit (for some ); types  <  exit at date 0, and may
re-enter, with higher types re-entering earlier. We assume that the discounted virtual surplus is
uniformly bounded, otherwise the commitment payo bV may not exist. And so r is well dened.

Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 9 (sketch)
(i) Decreasing attractiveness. Recall that the time-consistent cutos under decreasing attrac-
tiveness are given by myopic optimization, i.e., ^t;t is given by
 
 
^t;t ; st ; t

= 0;
and that the sequence ^t;t is monotonically increasing in t for a given t.
Let the agent behave myopically: xt = 1 i pt  (; st). Then setting prices is equivalent
to setting cutos (subject to the cuto being no smaller than the previous one). We look for an
equilibrium in which for all (t; t)
t;t  max

t 1 ; ^t;t
	
:
Given this, type t setting cuto 

t < ^t;t at date t (assuming this is allowed by previous
cutos) reduces the principal's date-t payo from the strict concavity of M (the fact that   is
increasing in ). At a future date  > t, either t is locally irrelevant
 
t < 

or t =  .
Because ^;t  ^t;t and by strict quasi-concavity, raising t slightly would also raise type t's
payo at date  in such events.
The existence of cuto f;g is obtained through a xed-point argument.
(ii) Increasing attractiveness. The strategy of proof is identical to that of case (i). Again, let
the agent behave myopically, and the principal set a cuto
t;t  max

t 1 ; ^t;t
	
where the time-consistent cuto ^t;t is no longer given by a myopic optimization (see Proposition
3). The strategy of proof again consists in using the strict monotonicity of the   function to
show that setting a cuto t < ^t;t is strictly suboptimal for type t at date t. 
38For the rst term and using the envelope theorem, we know that t=Tt=T () 
t T () (; st)  rT () is increasing
in  and that T () is decreasing in . Similarly, for the second term, T () can be seen as the time minimizing

t=T () 1
t=0 
t T () (; st) + rT ().
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Appendix F. Transient agent type
Proposition 11 (transient agent types). Assume that (; s) =  and  (; s) = 0. Suppose
that at t = 0; 1;    ;1, the agent's type is drawn in an i.i.d. manner from density f() and c.d.f.
F () on [; ] where   0 and the virtual surplus    (1   F ())=f() is strictly increasing.
Any Markov Perfect Equilibrium is characterized by a (uniquely dened and increasing in )
threshold  given by the following generalized virtual surplus:
J()     1  F (
)
f()
+

Z 

dF ()
1  [1  F ()] = 0 (1)
(if interior;  =  if J()  0 and  =  if J()  0)
The principal in each period sets price pt = 
+ 
Z 

(  )dF () conditional on the agent
not having exited yet. Letting m denote the monopoly price (i.e., m = [1   F (m)]=f(m)),
then  2 [0; m).
Proof. Let U , V andW denote the continuation payos (U for the agent, V for the principal and
W  U+V ). These are constant in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium, since the only payo-relevant
state variable is that the agent has not exited yet.
We treat only the case of an interior solution (the treatment of the corner solutions  = 
or  is analogous). Price p at date t induces a cuto  given by
   p + U = 0:
The principal solves
max

f[1  F ()] [( + U) + V ]g
which yields
   1  F (
)
f()
+ W = 0
with the continuation welfare given by
W =
Z 

dF () +

1  F ()W:
Simple computations show that J 0() > 0 whenever J() = 0. Hence the solution  is unique.
The price p is given by
p =  + U
where
U =
Z 

[   p + U ] f()d =
Z 

(   )f()d:
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The commitment solution for the environment described in Proposition 11 can be imple-
mented by a commitment to a sequence of prices:
pct = 0 for all t  1 and pc0 = c +
E[]
1   ;
where either
c   1  F (
c)
f(c)
+
E[]
1   = 0 or 
c =  and
E[]
1   
1
f()
  :
Note that
c  
(with equality only when  = ) and that for each t  1
pct  p  pc0
with strict inequalities whenever  > .
Relatedly, it is important for the analysis in Sections 3 and 4 that, in each period t, the
state of nature be public knowledge prior to price setting (or, if not, that the principal be able
to oer a state-contingent price pt). Suppose by contrast that at each date t the principal rst
learns the realization of st 1 (either directly or through the date-(t   1) realized demand); the
principal sets a price pt; the agents then observe st and decide whether to consume. The date-t
shock then plays a role similar to that of a transient shock to the agent's type, in that it confers
an informational advantage to the agent for exactly one period.39
39To make the basic point in the simplest manner, suppose that t = 0; 1; that st 2 R ; that  = st (homogeneous
preferences and no network externality); that  = 0 (costless production); and that st is i.i.d. with distribution
G.
At date t = 1, the principal sets pm = arg max p[1 G(p)]  (p). Let S(p) 
Z 1
p
(s  p)dG(s).
In the absence of commitment, the principal chooses p0 so as to solve:
max
fp0g
n
[1 G(p0   S(pm))] [p0 + (pm)]
o
= max
fs0g
n
[1 G(s0)] [s0 +  [(pm) + S(pm)]]
o
:
By contrast, the commitment outcome corresponds to the solution of
max
fs0g
n
[1 G(s0)] [s0 + S(0)]
o
since S(0) = max
fpg
[(p) + S(p)]. Under commitment, the principal charges a higher date-0 price and has a larger
date-0 clientele.
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